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利比亚战局将如何演变?

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小编摘要:内战极少能自然停息。仅仅这一点就足以说明,以上这些情况都不大可能。较为可能的有三种情况。一是持久战,哪一方都无法发起决定性的打击。这样,禁飞区能使作战双方在战场上势均力敌。

利比亚战局将如何演变?


今年是《考虑时间:决策者应借鉴历史》(Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers)一书出版25周年,该书阐述了如何最好地从过去的事件中汲取教训。这本书是“忘记历史的人注定将重蹈覆辙”这句格言的推论。这对今天的利比亚尤其适用——无论是支持还是反对军事干预利比亚的人,都已经从史海中寻找论据。
This year sees the 25th anniversary of the publication of Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, a text on how best to use lessons of the past. It provides a corollary to the aphorism that those who cannot remember history are condemned to repeat it. This is especially relevant in Libya, where history has been enlisted to make the case both for and against military intervention.
站在道德立场上对军事行动给予支持的人,包括总统巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama),经常表示不能重复1994年未能对卢旺达进行干预的错误。主张设立禁飞区的人,则会举出伊拉克北部或前南斯拉夫的例子。不过这些都并非完全相符。不像卢旺达,利比亚社会结构中并没有单一或主要的民族裂痕。穆阿迈尔?卡扎菲(Muammer Gaddafi)对反对派发出的无情镇压威胁,可能只是内乱局面中的威胁,目的是恫吓武装起来的反对派,并不见得针对班加西的所有男女老幼。
Those making the moral case for action, including President Barack Obama, often cite the need to avoid repeating the failure to intervene in Rwanda in 1994. Those arguing for no-fly zones recall northern Iraq, or the former Yugoslavia. But none of these is an exact fit. Unlike Rwanda, Libyan society is not structured along a single or dominant ethnic faultline. And Muammer Gaddafi’s threat to show no mercy to his opponents might have been just that: a threat, within the context of a civil uprising, to intimidate those who opposed him with arms. It was not necessarily a threat to every man, woman and child in Benghazi.
可以说,近几年在伊拉克和阿富汗的经验更有参考价值。重塑社会的宏大计划在遭遇了当地的现实后,进展并不顺利。那里的经验也证明了,要想把初期的军事胜利转化为长期的成果,是十分艰难而且代价高昂的——就像我们现在发现的,禁飞区并不能控制地面战局一样。
The case can be made that the recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are more relevant. There, grand schemes for remaking societies fared poorly when they encountered local realities. It also proved difficult and expensive to turn early military victories into lasting outcomes – just as we now learn that no-fly zones cannot control what happens on the ground.
在利比亚,最初的有限禁飞区已经开始演变为更具雄心的行动。然而我们仍未取得决定性突破。现在的问题与其说是按照我们迄今的路线进行干预是否正确,倒不如说是“现在该干什么?”
Already in Libya, what began as a limited no-fly zone is becoming something more ambitious. Still, we are where we are. The question is now less whether we were right to get involved along the lines we did but “what do we do now?”
联合国安理会第1973号决议所要求的立即停火,并停止任何针对平民的攻击的情况不太可能发生。但如果卡扎菲真的遵守了呢?美国要求卡扎菲下台,这与联合国决议的要求不同。奥巴马政府会接受卡扎菲政权继续存在吗?如果利比亚政府军遵守停火要求,而叛军没有遵守呢?
An immediate ceasefire and an end to all attacks against civilians – as demanded by UN Security Council resolution 1973 – is an unlikely scenario. But what if Colonel Gaddafi actually did comply? The US, unlike the UN resolution, is calling for him to be ousted. Would the Obama administration accept the continued existence of his regime? And what if his forces respected the ceasefire but the rebels did not?
内战极少能自然停息。仅仅这一点就足以说明,以上这些情况都不大可能。较为可能的有三种情况。一是持久战,哪一方都无法发起决定性的打击。这样,禁飞区能使作战双方在战场上势均力敌,周日叛军夺回石油重镇卜雷加(Brega)和拉斯拉努夫(Ras Lanuf)就是一个例子,但这会延长内战,造成更多苦难和生命损失。如果出于人道主义立场而采取的军事行动竟造成了这样的后果,那么就会既讽刺又悲哀。但这的确是可能的。
All of this is improbable, if for no other reason than civil wars rarely just stop. Three scenarios are more likely. The first is continued fighting, with no side striking a decisive blow. Here the no-fly zone would have levelled the playing field, as shown by the rebels retaking the oil towns of Brega and Ras Lanuf on Sunday – but with civil war prolonged. More suffering and loss of life would be the result. It would be ironic, even tragic, if this were the outcome of an action justified on humanitarian grounds. But it is possible.
通过外交斡旋结束战争也是可能的,但这同样可能性不大。相反,国际社会可能需要考虑增加对反对派的支持。可以出动外国军队以提供直接支持,也可向反对派提供武器,以提供间接支持。
It is also possible that diplomacy could then bring an end to the fighting, but that too is a long shot. Instead, the international community will more likely have to consider escalating its support for the regime’s opponents. This could happen directly, by introducing foreign forces, or indirectly, by providing arms to the rebels.
第二种情况是卡扎菲政府倒台。这种情况可能通过支持叛军,或卡扎菲政权内部瓦解而实现。不过历史经验显示,在可以团结反对派的目标(仇恨现政权)达成之后,反对派更有可能四分五裂。
Scenario two is the fall of Col Gaddafi’s government. This could follow support for the rebels, or the implosion of the regime. But here history suggests the opposition is more likely to splinter, once it had accomplished the one objective that united it: hostility to the regime.
如果卡扎菲政权的确倒台了,那么几乎可以肯定必须向利比亚派驻外国维和部队,或某种更有力的军事存在,以提供安全保障。然而尴尬的是,目前这种军事存在是授权设立禁飞区的联合国决议所明确禁止的。况且也不清楚部队该由谁派出,成本该由谁负担。更令人担忧的一个问题是,反对派能否将自身转化为一个全国性组织,有能力代表利比亚人民的利益执政?然而我们对自己支持的这些人了解实在不多,因此完全有可能出现这样一种情况:一些反对派脱离阵营,在利比亚某些地区乃至全国实行不宽容的伊斯兰统治。
If the regime did fall, a foreign peacekeeping force or something more capable would almost certainly have to be sent to Libya to provide security. Awkwardly,?such a presence is currently explicitly banned by the UN resolution authorising the no-fly zone. It is also unclear who would provide the troops, or pick up the costs. A bigger worry is whether the opposition could transform itself into a national entity, able to rule in the interests of the Libyan people. But we simply don’t know a great deal about the people we are siding with, so it is just as plausible to imagine some rebels breaking off, and introducing an intolerant Islamist rule in part or all of the country.
第三种情况是利比亚现政权设法打赢内战。短期来看,国际社会将不得不谈判。长期来看,西方会面临一个更艰难的选择:试图通过秘密行动和制裁推翻现政权,或通过经济或其他手段约束它的行为。毕竟,说服卡扎菲放弃大规模杀伤性武器靠的就是这种手段。
The third scenario sees Libya’s regime finding a way to prevail. In the short term the world would then have to negotiate. In the long term the west would face a more difficult choice: try to overthrow the regime through covert action and sanctions, or just modify its behaviour with economic and other measures. This was, after all, the approach that persuaded Col Gaddafi to give up weapons of mass destruction.
然而现在利比亚充满了各方力量和各种变数,无法预测军事干预会有怎样的结果。谁都不知道下一步会发生什么,更无法预测倘若发生什么会造成怎样的结果。但历史经验表明取得成功是很难的。即使取得了成功,花费的时间和成本、始料未及的后果也都会多于许多人最初的预期。
There are too many actors and variables at work in Libya to predict how this military intervention will play out. No one can know what will come next, much less what will come after that. But history suggests that success will be hard to achieve. And if it comes, it will take more time, prove more costly, and have more unexpected consequences than many originally anticipated.
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2011-03-30 14:21 编辑:icetonado
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